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Introduction Nepal’s media have been lauded for their positive contribution to 
democratic political discourse amidst the turmoil of the post-revolutionary 
period (Onta, 2006), but today have become the focus of anxiety. Radio in 
particular, due to the relatively low costs of production and accessibility to 
listeners with low or no literacy, has seen huge growth in Nepal and 
corresponding hopes for its potential to improve the lives of Nepal’s citizens. 
However, as a recent policy paper from an independent Nepali research 
organization, Martin Chautari (Anonymous, 2012, p. 2), explains: 
 
 
Despite their somewhat positive roles, FM radios have not been 
able to carry the voices of marginalized citizens. The concerns of 
the poor and marginalized citizens living in remote areas, local 
issues and the language spoken by the majority in those areas have 
not received appropriate space in FM radios. Not only are there few 
programs containing local concerns and in local languages, even 
when they do exist, with a few exceptions, they are given minimum 
priority in terms of time and space. 
 
The paper goes on to explain that, ‘studies have shown that the operational 
management of FM radios remains in the hands of the powerful and FM radios 
have been unable to play their expected roles for the rights of the poor and 
marginalized’ (ibid.). In addition, commercialization of the radio sector, and 
inadequacies in the policy and regulatory framework of broadcast licensing 
compound these problems. This is leading to competition between radio stations 
that is eroding the quality of listener experience through signal interference and 
replacement of community-oriented programming with more advertiser-friendly 
content (Wilmore & Upreti, 2011). 
 
Inevitably, the impact of these changes is felt most by those who are already 
politically, socially and economically marginalized (Thorsen, 2013). Foremost 
amongst these are ethnic (janājāti) and untouchable caste (dalit) communities 
who have been discriminated against systematically, either overtly during the 
time of the Shah and Rana autocracies or covertly following the official banning 
of discrimination in the various constitutions under which Nepal has been 
governed since the 1950s. 
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Evidence that patterns of ownership and policy failures have indeed 
compounded the disenfranchisement of many within the contemporary 
mediascape of Nepal is not hard to find. The conditions necessary to foster 
“citizens’ media” of the type described by Rodriguez (2001), through which ‘a 
collectivity is enacting its citizenship by actively intervening and transforming 
the established mediascape’ (p. 20), appear to be eroding in Nepal, despite the 
best efforts of some broadcasters and advocacy groups to foster alternative 
‘moral economies of communicative activity’ (Murdock, 2013) based on public 
and community arrangements for the production of media content, rather than 
those based on commercial imperatives (Bhattarai, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, we must also challenge the assumption that marginalized people 
are ‘passive reactors to…some “system,”’ acquiescing to their exclusion from 
media production. Ethnographic data helps us explore how some producers and 
consumers from particular ethnic groups—in this case Tamang people—have 
been ‘active agents and subjects in their own history’ (Rankin, 2004, p. 70, 
quoting Sherry Ortner). By examining instances of varying successes and failures 
of Tamang communicative practices, we are able to see how they have utilised 
media to construct ethnic identity in the contested cultural spaces of 
contemporary Nepal. Political agency arises in these circumstances not only from 
the way that these practices create new forms of social solidarity in the face of 
on-going discrimination, but also through the formation of new types of 
consciousness regarding ethnic identities. Such identities do not always accord 
with the portrayal of ethnicity by political leaders and activists in the public 
sphere, especially as it relates to the ethnic identity of youths and women. 
 
Public concern over the absence of Tamang and other janājāti programming in 
Nepal’s media not only evidences the struggle for representation of ethnic 
groups as a whole in the modern nation-state, but also demonstrates how power 
is mobilised within marginalised communities. Paying equal attention to 
practices of media consumption, which has itself often been marginalized in the 
study of the political-economy of media (Morley, 1995), with a subsequent 
impact on how media contribute to the construction of gender inequality 
(Meehan, 2012), allows us to widen our analysis to understand how different 
agents come to view their ethnicity through mediated social practices, rather 
than simply assuming that the representation of minority ethnicity in 
programming, including content in minority languages, is in and of itself equally 
empowering for all who such programming claims to represent. Taking 
inspiration from post-colonial feminist theory, we argue that analyses of 
minority media in South Asia must avoid ‘homozenizing and systematizing the 
experiences of different groups of women [and others who are potentially 
marginalized within minority groups] in these countries, [because this] erases all 
marginal and resistant modes and experiences’ (Mohanty, 2012, p. 360). 
 
Background: media and minority representation in republican Nepal 
Before 1990 Nepal was ruled by a monarchy with close to absolute power, 
although this was rapidly eroding from its zenith in the 1970s. Political parties 
were banned under what was dubbed the Panchayat system, but operated with 
increasing support from bases in India. Media were largely state controlled and 
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used to promote both the monarchy and successive governments’ policies of 
modernisation and development. Rent seeking and corruption became endemic, 
but (not surprisingly) were seldom overtly discussed in the media. State-
controlled media also supported an aggressive drive toward cultural unification 
that emphasised the Hindu religion and Nepali language of the ruling elites as the 
essential components of national culture and identity. 
 
Riaz and Basu (2010) go so far as to describe these attempts at nation building as 
a form of ‘internal colonisation’ that denied the ethnic, religious and linguistic 
reality of Nepal’s complex population. Census data, always politically charged, 
seemed to indicate that, even at the height of the Panchayat system, mother-
tongue speakers of Nepali formed only a bare majority of the population. 
Likewise, identification of Hinduism as the majority religion also oversimplified 
the complex role that religion plays in the network of political relationships in 
the Himalayan region (Burghart, 1984). Not surprisingly, these official 
discourses of nationalism and development led to the exclusion of many 
minority ethnic groups from government and the bureaucracy (Pradhan, 2002). 
 
The contradictions between the representation of ethnicity in the Panchayat 
nation-state and the reality of minority ethnic people’s experience of political 
disempowerment and poverty are part of the explanation (but, of course, not the 
only reason) for the collapse of the Panchayat in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Subsequent censuses have included direct questions regarding ethnic identity 
and these have made the pattern of ethnicity in Nepal much clearer (Sharma, 
2008). At the same time, political revolution and the liberalisation of the media 
have created new opportunities for ethnic inequalities to be openly debated.  
 
Print media were quick to expand during the decade following the establishment 
of a democratic system of government. By 2005 there were 3,740 newspapers 
registered for publication, either as weeklies or dailies, although only 323 were 
being regularly published (Bhattarai, 2007). Likewise, licenses were granted to 
independent FM radio stations from 1996, despite the reluctance of successive 
governments to liberalize broadcasting. Fifty-six licenses were issued (with 46 
actually broadcasting) by 2004 (Bhattarai, 2007), but the Maoist ‘People’s War’ 
led successive governments to limit the expansion of radio, fearing, often with 
justification, that radio was serving the interests of the Maoist forces (Hutt, 
2006). This culminated in the attempted suppression of press and broadcasting 
freedom during the brief return to absolute rule under King Gyanendra 
(February 1st 2005 to 24th April 2006). The collapse of the monarchy’s rule 
following the declaration of an accord between the Maoists and other major 
political parties, accompanied by the declaration of an interim republican 
constitution and elections for a Constituent Assembly, accelerated the expansion 
of FM broadcasting. By 2013 there were 515 licensed FM stations, of which 360 
were actively broadcasting (UNESCO, 2013). 
 
Pradhan notes that ‘language became the most visible and emotive issue around 
which [janājāti] activists mobilized within and among communities’ (Pradhan, 
2002, p. 14), and radio offered a means through which these identities could be 
articulated (Suryadi, 2005). Broadcasting in languages other than Nepali has 
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often been a focus for agitation by ethnic minorities, because the state 
broadcaster, Radio Nepal, did not broadcast in other languages prior to 1990, 
which increased the sense of marginalization felt by these communities 
(Parajulee, 2007). The liberalisation of media production has served as an index 
of the changing political landscape of Nepal since the advent of multiparty 
democracy in 1990. Broadcasting in languages other than Nepali and 
programming that addresses a wider range of cultural concerns is certainly 
occurring. The sheer number of new, independent media producers and the fact 
that in some cases they reflect obvious local demand for more linguistically 
diverse content seems to support the claim that, even in the midst of immense 
public frustration with the slow pace of political and economic progress, media 
at least are changing for the better (Onta, 2006). However, there is also growing 
concern that this progress is being undermined and this will have a particular 
impact on ethnic and caste groups who have the greatest need for improved 
representation in the media to advance their socio-political status and welfare 
(Onta, 2002, pp. 264-266).  
 
Ideally community radio stations that serve the needs of distinctive audiences 
are differentiated from commercial radio stations and thereby enabled to give 
‘voice to the voiceless’ (Banjade, 2006). However, Nepal’s current regulatory 
environment provides little or no protection to community radio stations, which 
have to operate under the same legal and regulatory framework as commercial 
broadcasters. Consequently, although broadcasters may aspire to operate as 
community broadcasters serving the needs of their local communities, they are 
forced to compromise these ideals in the pursuit of scare sources of revenue. 
This has resulted in ‘a fiercely competitive environment in which [there are] 
problems of signal interference and the need to increase audience sizes to 
capture advertising revenue’ (Martin & Wilmore, 2010, p. 868). Thus Radio 
Palung (a community radio station based in the hills of Makwanpur), for 
example, sought funding from The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to establish a relay tower to increase the size of their 
broadcast radius. They stated that this was “to fulfill listener demands from 
other remote areas” (interview, 2009), but would also give them a larger 
listenership and consequently a larger market for revenue-raising from 
advertising. Many other stations pursue the costly goals of increased 
transmission power and tower size (Wilmore & Upreti, 2011), plus even 
lengthier programming schedules that entail the use of content sought from 
either commercial networks or INGOs, which is almost exclusively Nepali 
language and often focused on the concerns of the nation’s capital, Kathmandu, 
where they are invariably produced (Pringle & Subba, 2007). Political 
interference by parties and government continues to be of concern (Rijal, 2014), 
as does a chronic lack of media professionals with appropriate levels of training 
in journalism and content production, especially from minority language groups, 
given the fact that Nepali dominates all post-primary education (UNESCO, 2013, 
pp. 66-75). 
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“We can’t make the whole program in Tamang language”: challenges of 
creating Tamang language media 
The Tamang are one of the larger ethnic groups of Nepal, making up 
approximately five percent of the population (Sharma, 2008) and more than fifty 
percent of the population of Makwanpur district (Government of Nepal, 2007), 
the location of the ethnographic material used in this chapter. Tamang people 
are of Tibeto-Burmese descent with language similar to Tibetan, and distinctive 
ritual and cultural practices (Holmberg, 2005). The Muluki Ain (lit. ‘law of the 
land’), Nepal’s first national legal code was promulgated in the 19th century by 
the then ruling Rana regime, and classified the people who are today known as 
Tamang as an ‘enslaveable’ in order to guarantee a ready source of corvée 
labour. This fealty to the ruling elite was further enshrined by the way the 
Muluki Ain subsumed the Tamang into the Hindu caste hierarchy, despite most 
being Buddhist (Hofer, 1979). 
 
A government edict in 1932 formally declared that Tamang was now the official 
term used to refer to the groups who had hitherto been called or self-identified 
as Lama, Murmi, Sain and Bhoté or Bhotiya (March, 2002). By doing so the state 
imposed a uniformity on Tamang communities that, whilst potentially 
unwarranted and the basis for on-going discrimination, has today transformed 
into a janājāti identity that is enthusiastically adopted by many Tamang 
individuals and organizations as a means for confronting the legacy of 
discrimination. Although Tamang people continue to suffer from worse levels of 
poverty compared to those from other ethnic groups in their localities and are 
greatly underrepresented in both public and private institutions, organisations 
of different types have placed the Tamang at the forefront of the janājāti 
movement (Kukuczka, 2011). This includes organisations that promote the 
formation of a Tamang national identity.  
 
The janājāti movement draws on the past objectification and abuse of ethnic 
groups of people in Nepal, which has been railed against by Tamang people (see 
for example Holmberg, 2000). As Tamang (2001, p. 22) asserts: 
 
The Janājāti movement rests on the shared concerns that virulent 
discrimination persisted historically in multicultural Nepal. The 
movement is based on the common experience of the ethnic and 
indigenous populace that despite the traditional rhetoric of 'unity 
in diversity' and democratic equality, discrimination is continually 
reproduced. They feel it intensely in almost every dimension of 
their lives, including economic prosperity, political participation, 
educational access, and cultural dignity.  
 
Although not specifically mentioned by Tamang, we can include the lack of 
access to and representation in media as one of the most significant ways that 
these feelings of discrimination are experienced daily. 
 
In this section we use the example of a Tamang language radio production in 
Makwanpur district to demonstrate how ethnic exclusion from media occurs in 
practice. The setting is Hetauda, the district headquarters and municipality of 
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Makwanpur district, where ‘Hetauda FM’ (a commercial radio station) produced 
a Tamang language local version of a radio program called Naya Nepal (New 
Nepal), produced by Kathmandu-based non-government organisation (NGO), 
Equal Access Nepal (EAN). Naya Nepal (NN) provided a platform for the 
explanation, discussion, and promotion of peace, reconciliation, justice, security 
and the democratic process that was underway following the formal cessation of 
the civil conflict in 2006. The local version, referred to by its Tamang name Chhar 
Nepal (CN), was one of many local versions supported by an EAN initiative 
funded by USAID and the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) to increase the 
accessibility of information to marginalised communities. CN discussed issues of 
justice and inequality, using a format prescribed by EAN: topic introduction by a 
presenter, report, interview, and vox pops. EAN also provided a range of 
supports to assist local productions, including funding, training and the 
provision of community reporters, who recorded the opinions of people 
throughout Nepal for broadcast within the NN and CN programs. 
 
The production and broadcast of CN faced many challenges, including the 
instability of the FM sector, the frequency with which new stations are 
established, over-reliance on aid funding, and difficulty sourcing Tamang 
speakers. There was also a major conflict between the presenters and 
management of Hetauda FM. The presenters, including the CN presenter, quit 
and formed their own FM station with the financial backing of a former producer 
at Hetauda FM who had gone on to establish a prosperous media hardware 
distribution company. The making of CN was halted as another Tamang-speaking 
producer was recruited. The new producer continued to work with the 
community reporters until funding ended, at which point the CN program ended 
to make way for more commercially-appealing programming.  
 
Chhar Nepal produced and broadcast programmes that discussed issues of 
justice and inequality, with particular reference to minority groups. In one 
episode the issues faced by indigenous Chepang peoplei were addressed. CN, 
which followed a format prescribed by EAN of topic introduction by a presenter, 
report, interview, and vox pops, faced a problem that was endemic to making the 
program—the difficulty of sourcing people who could speak Tamang. Chepang 
people are not Tamang speakers and the program was broadcast as a mixture of 
Tamang and Nepali languages. Even when programs focussed exclusively on 
Tamang issues and included Tamang people, there was reluctance to speak in 
Tamang language. The community reporters could often be heard sighing 
audibly when Tamang people, most often girls and young women, would decline 
to comment in Tamang language before dissolving into giggles. Commenting on 
this challenge, one community reporter said, “it’s a bit difficult to get Tamang 
experts for Chhar Nepal. We can’t make the whole program in Tamang language. 
It’s a weakness [of the program]” (interview, 2009). Such unwillingness to speak 
in Tamang appears to arise, at least in part, because voice is a proxy for agency 
and as such is tightly constrained within the habitus of broadcasting (Ahearn, 
2000; Kunreuther, 2006). 
 
There was little evidence that the program was well listened to. While it is 
arguable that political claims to ethnic identity and rights are strengthened by 
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the inclusion of local languages in mainstream media such as CN, this implies 
that there is an audience for the program that listens to and understands it. The 
producers of CN maintained that it had an audience in remote areas of 
Makwanpur where Tamang people were unable to understand or speak Nepali, a 
situation in which the bi-lingual nature of the program would surely create 
problems. However, it was hard to find anyone who claimed to be a regular or 
even occasional listener, even amongst avid radio listeners. When asked directly, 
people would claim that the program aired during scheduled power cuts and so 
they weren’t able to listen to it.  
 
Minority groups entering into the mediascape often find themselves unable to 
assert a continuing need for broadcasting in languages other than Nepali unless 
this is supported by external agencies, such as INGOs, whose support may not be 
sustained in the long-term, as was the case here. The potential power of 
broadcasting to reduce inequalities through the provision of space in the 
mediascape may not be realised in practice even when space is opened for 
content. Of particular concern is the continued reluctance of janājāti people with 
access to media production facilities to make use of this opportunity due to the 
deeply inculcated habitus relating to the ‘natural’ use of Nepali as the warranted 
language of communication in the media and the habitus of media industry 
practice. 
 
In its demise this particular example of janājāti media seems to confirm 
pessimism regarding the ability of Nepalese media to support the empowerment 
of minorities. However, the following description of Tamang media audiences 
provides a counterpoint by showing how particular types of media consumption 
practice—in this case, radio listener clubs—assert more confident expressions of 
ethnic identity. In doing so, we also invert one of the normative assumptions in 
studies of the empowerment of minorities through media usage, which is that 
control over production is the most crucial determinant of this empowerment, 
whilst consumption tends not to be regarded as having the same capacity for 
progressive political empowerment. We do not deny that control over and 
involvement in the production of media content is of vital importance, but we 
instead demonstrate that consumption activities may play an important role in 
the development of the confidence required for minority peoples to enter into 
the public sphere and media institutions. Radio listener clubs have been used in 
a range of contexts as elements of development programs. Studies from Malawi, 
Nigeria and India demonstrate that group radio listening consumption practices 
contribute to participants’ ability to talk about and act on challenges they face 
(Martins, 2003; Mchakulu, 2007; Singhal, Sharma, Papa, & Witte, 2004).  
 
Awāj uṭhāune: to raise one’s voice 
 
I used to think that people are disrespecting us and discriminating 
against us only and that this did not happen to anybody else...Before I 
could not say anything and was scared thinking what to say and how 
to speak. A year ago SSMK [Sathisanga Manka Kura] broadcast one 
program which matched our situation…only then I realised that I 
should oppose and challenge others if [their views are] not acceptable 
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to me (Dudumaya, interviewed 2009). 
 
Dudumaya, a young Tamang woman who heads the Janahit Yūba Samuha (Youth 
Group for People’s Welfare, hereafter referred to as ‘Janahit’), is the middle child 
of a Tamang family displaced from a remote area of Makwanpur by a flood in 
1993. Janahit is a listeners’ club associated with the SSMK radio program, which 
provides a forum in which young people can gather, listen to and discuss the 
program. However, many groups also conduct activities to raise awareness in 
their local communities on issues discussed in the radio programs. The Janahit 
club members undertook a number of awareness-raising activities that have 
elsewhere been conceptualised as productions or remediations (Greenland, 
2012; Greenland & Skuse, 2015). To undertake these activities the club members 
first needed to develop the confidence to be assertive, a confidence gained by 
socialising with other young people via the listener clubs.  
 
The Janahit club members live in Banaspati, a village created to house victims of 
floods that left hundreds homeless in 1993. Banaspati is both disadvantaged and 
divided owing to the diversity of the flood victims who may otherwise not be 
poverty-affected or neighbours. Additionally, social ties between inhabitants 
have been slow to build owing to the ever-present caste and ethnic divisions 
within the village. The Janahit club members often spoke about not knowing 
anyone and consequent social isolation. This changed when a number of young 
Tamangs, who later formed the Janahit club, met through a Tamang cultural 
organisation. They became friends and developed supportive relationships that 
helped to build trust and norms of reciprocity between the members (Putnam, 
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). A major concern for many was the poverty and 
disadvantage experienced by inhabitants of Banaspati village. Seeking support 
from various organisations, they formed a club to foster their ability to address 
social issues. The members often referred to themselves as a collective and, 
while club members exercised agency as individuals, the club created a platform 
that enabled collective agency (Ahearn, 2000). 
 
The Janahit club members described this agency as the ‘ability to speak’. 
Tulkumaya, the younger sister of Dudumaya and a member of an affiliated child 
club established by Janahit, said that before she joined the club she had mostly 
stayed at home and did not have close relationships with other people in the 
village. Suman, another club member, claimed that, “I joined [the club to] give me 
confidence so that I could speak among people and face them” (interview, 2008). 
Similarly, many founding members spoke about the transformation they 
experienced in finding their voices incidentally through the club, which became a 
space for experiences that helped club members develop their confidence. As 
Bimla explained, “My peers can’t talk or face other people...but I can...The club 
gave me confidence” (interview, 2009). 
 
Dudumaya, quoted at the start of this section, realised she could oppose the 
views of others if they were not acceptable to her. By doing so she evidenced 
how developing confidence to speak is a political endeavour. Her comment is 
linked to the term awāj uṭhāune—to raise one’s voice (Kunreuther, 2009). Voice 
is a metaphor for agency (Kunreuther, 2010) and has figured centrally in 
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political agitation for change since the 1990s (op. cit.). Dudumaya and the Janahit 
club members used their newly found voices to assert themselves as 
knowledgeable, modern and developed during various public activities. For 
example, at the celebration of Tamang New Year in Banaspati village attendees 
engaged in a program of eating and oration. Guests were asked to speak about 
the Janahit club and make suggestions for improvement, each one of which was 
criticized by Dudumaya. Invitees later stated that they felt taken aback by 
Dudumaya’s fierce defense of the club and called her proud and self-important. 
These responses make evident the surprising impact of vocal intervention by a 
young Tamang woman. Her opposition to criticism was also a deeper response to 
past and current attitudes and behaviours that position Tamang youths and 
women in less powerful positions relative to others both within and between 
Nepal’s ethnic groups. 
 
Dudumaya’s defense against the criticisms was an active process through which 
she was crafting a subjectivity that is different from historical narratives that 
position Tamang as backward, unable to speak and unworthy of being listened 
to. Such self-transformations are an integral part of a locally experienced and 
practiced modernity in which young Tamangs are aspiring to futures different 
from those of their parents. This is, as a SSMK producer once described it, an 
achieved future rather than an ascribed one. In acting thus, Dudumaya was 
asserting agency as a Tamang person, but also as a young Tamang woman in 
particular. Such self-assertions of agency are part of the local experience and 
practice of janājāti identity in contemporary Nepal. Similarly, Bordonaro (2009) 
has discussed how young men in Guinea-Bissau have used discourses of 
development and modernisation to subvert traditional power relations, and in so 
doing have been able to create discursive spaces in which they can act with 
agency that they would not have been otherwise accorded.  
 
Discussion 
Today the formation of the new federal republican Nepali state continues to 
influence Tamang ethnic identity, as it does the identity of all janājāti peoples. 
However, the utilization of janājāti as a pan-indigenous category of identity and 
the mobilisation of this collective identity to influence the direction of political 
change in Nepal demonstrates that the relationship between state formation and 
ethnicity is changing. Janājāti identity was once a mechanism for subjugation and 
internal colonisation, but is today being used as a tool of liberation (Kukuczka, 
2011). 
 
Processes of identity formation are today subject to greater contestation due to 
the opening up of the communication context. This contestation has tended to be 
seen in terms of the obvious public political discourse surrounding crucial 
matters such as the mobilisation of janājāti communities during the Maoist 
People’s War and the role of janājāti representatives in the Constituent 
Assemblies. These issues have been publically discussed and argued over in the 
Nepalese media, and it is the absence of janājāti control over these media 
representations that is of greatest concern when we consider questions of media 
content production. The continuing paucity of content in minority languages 
generates fear that elites will again dominate janājāti identities. Our examination 
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of the difficulties experienced by Tamang radio producers in Makwanpur 
support this fear. Calls by organisations such as The Association of Community 
Radio Broadcasters (ACORAB) and Martin Chautari for reform to Nepal’s media 
policies and regulations to protect community broadcasters take on particular 
urgency given the delicate political situation while the new federal constitution 
comes into effect. 
 
It is equally clear that we should not assume that janājāti audiences simply 
acquiesce to the construction of identities in terms that are wholly determined 
by the political or commercial imperatives of those who control media 
production. Media researchers have provided ample evidence and argument to 
support the claim that media consumers frequently appropriate and reinterpret 
media content to suit their own social and political purposes (see for example 
Novak, 2010). It is also important to note that this appropriation does not simply 
take the form of ‘mainstream’ content being resisted by ‘alternative’ audiences 
according to interpretations that align with the political aims of those who claim 
to be the ‘official’ political representatives of minorities. 
 
This may happen, of course, and exclusion from the mainstream mediascape 
often leads to alternative media activities designed to support opposition groups 
that form around the ethnic identities of those who are often excluded from 
power. Given the prevailing political culture in Nepal, there is no reason to 
assume that those who control janājāti political groups and parties will behave 
any differently to the major political parties, such as the Nepal Congress, UML 
and Maoists, when attempting to co-opt media organizations to their own ends. 
 
However, the examination of media consumption practices, particularly radio 
listener groups, indicates that other forces are influencing the formation of 
identity. Firstly, janājāti identities, especially those of janājāti youths, are being 
constructed in the midst of rapid movement towards a market-based, capitalist 
economy (Liechty, 2003). The poor living standards of very many Nepalis remain 
of paramount concern, especially when they lead to problems such as trafficking 
and economic migration into forms of debt bondage. Intransigent support for 
market reforms based on neoliberal ideology by successive Nepali governments 
are clearly leading to a polarisation of living standards, because for many 
Nepalis, particularly those living in urban or peri-urban areas, including janājāti 
peoples, living standards are improving.  
 
The construction of janājāti identity is, therefore occurring in the midst of the 
arrival of new resources for identities based on commodity consumption. Not 
only do these compete with other forms of identity construction, possibly even 
being portrayed at times as inimical to ‘traditional’ cultural elements of identity, 
but they also generate new resources for ethnic identity formation. As noted 
above in relation to production, there is no necessary reason why consumption 
activities should align with normative assumptions regarding the adoption of 
individualism as a direct corollary of neoliberalism. Consumption may reinforce 
social connections as much as it divides and discriminates, but it then becomes 
imperative to examine under what circumstances such different outcomes occur 
(Miller, 1995). 
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The considerable investment, both financial and otherwise, that consumers put 
into decision-making regarding the purchase of commodities and the subsequent 
uses to which these are put indicates that consumers are well aware of the 
possible consequences of their actions, although Bourdieu also indicates that the 
habitus of social actors often precludes reflexivity when making such 
calculations (Bourdieu, 1977). Media consumption itself becomes a key means 
through which consumers become expert ‘players of the game’ and come to an 
understanding of the different symbolic valuations placed upon commodities 
within the totality of the market in all its dimensions, both economic and 
cultural, with potentially serious social consequences for those making 
miscalculations. 
 
These risks are more pronounced for those marginalised because they lack other 
forms of capital, especially cultural capital related to one’s ethnic positioning in 
the political landscape of the nation-state. It is for this reason that we see janājāti 
consumers in Nepal keen to utilise media resources and collective activities to 
coordinate consumption, including the consumption of media content itself, 
through activities such as listener groups. We see this process at work in the 
situations described in this ethnography when Tamang members of listener 
clubs utilise media content as means to ‘create social spaces for collective 
reflection on individual experiences of subordination and powerlessness’ 
(Rankin, 2004, p. 203).  
 
The raising of consciousness examined here is (at least!) triply articulated, 
because the members of the listeners club not only reflect on their relative 
disempowerment as Tamang people in Nepal, but also as youths and/or women 
in a society that often allows little scope for young people—especially women—
to engage in meaningful political action. It is also important to note that the 
organizations through which janājāti identities are most vigorously promoted 
are often dominated by a limited (male and highly educated) cross-section of 
society. As Kukuczka (2011, p. 424) observes: 
 
It is crucial to note that most activists by virtue of both having an 
intellectual university background and being members of their 
respective group follow an agenda and have the knowledge and 
authority to speak for the group as a whole. However, ‘ordinary’ 
people and activists do not necessarily share the same view on 
issues related to ethnic identity, the interpretation of history and 
resulting claims. Therefore ethnic activism can possibly result in 
the homogenization of a group by promoting a certain set of 
practices and features and denying others. 
 
However, consumption activities, as evidence from feminist media studies 
research consistently demonstrates, frequently offer spaces for identity 
construction that often defy or critique normative expectations regarding 
women’s agency (Meehan, 2012), although the reverse can, and often does, 
happen. 
 
12 
 
Conclusion 
Ethnographic research provides holistic insights into the practices that Nepali 
consumers engaged in to construct varied expressions of collective and self-
identity that both acknowledge historical and existing inequalities, whilst also 
creating shared audience experience that fosters a capacity to speak out on 
matters of concern. The question that now remains to be asked, rather than 
prematurely answered, is how a new generation of janājāti youth—brought up in 
the turbulent political climate of new Nepal and the changing context of an 
increasingly commercial mediascape—will use this capacity to speak out and 
take consequential action in their lives. This cannot be predetermined, but we 
can and should be attentive to the full complement of voices raised, for it is the 
range of voices heard today that makes today’s Nepal a truly different place. We 
do not deny that control over and involvement in the production of media 
content is of vital importance, but we instead demonstrate that consumption 
activities may play an important role in the development of the confidence 
required for minority peoples to enter into the public sphere and media 
institutions. 
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i Chepangs are marginalised indigenous people of Tibeto-Burmese descent living 
predominantly in the central region of Nepal, including Makwanpur district (SNV 
Netherlands Development Organisation and Nepal Chepang Association, 2008; 
Bista, 1967). Similar to Tamang people, Chepang people were included in the 
caste hierarchy in a low position, which enabled their subjugation.  
